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COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICY:
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: DO DIFFERENCES
MATTER?
John 0. Haleyt
Abstract: This article deals with the question of differences in competition policy
enforcement regimes in Japan, Europe and the United States. In answer to the question
"Do differences matter?", the author concludes that they matter less than conventional
wisdom suggests at least in terms of "fairness" and effectiveness. The article challenges
the widely held views that Japan's competition rules are ineffectively enforced and that
U.S. antitrust enforcement, especially treble damage actions, have had an unfair impact
on foreign firms. The article concludes with recommendations for greater cooperation
between trade regulation and antitrust enforcement authority in the United States and
among competition policy enforcement authority internationally.
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Perhaps for the first time in trade negotiations between any two na-
tions, lax enforcement of competition policy became an issue during the
course of bilateral United States-Japanese trade talks in the 1980s. The
United States explicitly charged that inadequate sanctions and weak en-
forcement of Japan's postwar Antimonopoly Lawl constituted a barrier to
U.S. access to Japanese consumer and industrial markets, thus becoming
t Garvey, Schubert & Barer Professor of Law, Director of Asian Law Program, Professor of
International Studies, University of Washington.
I Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kasei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu [Law Concerning the
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947.
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another factor contributing to the chronic imbalance in U.S.-Japanese bilat-
eral trade in manufactured goods.2 Therefore, proposals for strengthening
Japanese competition law enforcement were high on the United States
agenda for corrective Japanese, action during the Structural Impediments
Initiative ("SII") negotiations.3 The United States trade negotiators were
not the first, however, to raise enforcement of competition policy as a trade
issue. Beginning in the early 1970s, Japanese enterprises had increasingly
complained that their U.S. competitors were using private treble damage
actions under U.S. antitrust laws as an anticompetitive weapon to counter
successful Japanese entry in U.S. markets. 4
Although sparse and largely descriptive, scholarship on competition
enforcement in the two countries provides some support for both American
and Japanese views.5 Similar issues, however, have rarely if ever arisen in
2 See, e.g., United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (S11), Hearing Before the Senate
Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Finance, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990). The United
States' position was bolstered by widespread belief that the prevalence of exclusionary business practices,
presumably illegal under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act and reinforced by so-called keiretsu
relationships, has severely restricted market access to foreign goods and services. Japanese markets are
closed, the argument runs, as a result of illegal, anticompetitive barriers to entry not merely investment
disincentives resulting from an extremely competitive industrial structure. Japanese competition policy
therefore must have failed. This article of faith led inexorably to the conclusion that Japan's failure to
enforce its existing competition rules more effectively was to blame. See, e.g., LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON,
WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 57, 100, 120, 122, 276,
(1992). More effective enforcement of the law was thus included as one of several factors identified as a
Japanese market impediment to foreign goods and services against which the United States pressed the
Japanese government to take corrective action. For a critical examination of these premises, see generally
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE? (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990).
3 See U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE, JOINT REPORT
OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (Tokyo, June 28,
1990).
4 Federal District Judge Edward R. Becker voiced the complaints of Japanese defendants in many
antitrust actions when describing the 15 year long antitrust and antidumping treble damage actions brought
in 1971 by Zenith and National Union Electric against the Japanese electronics industry, as "an 'ersatz'
antitrust case". Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1333 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
5 Scholarly commentary outside of Japan on the enforcement of the Japanese Antimonopoly and
Fair Trade Law has been almost uniformly critical. See Kozo YAMAMURA, ECONOMIC POLICY IN
POSTWAR JAPAN: GROWTH VERSUS ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 54-86 (1967); DAN F. HENDERSON, FOREIGN
ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 149-54 (1973); WOLFGANG PAPE, GYOSEI SHIDO UND DAS ANTI-MONOPOL-GESETZ
IN JAPAN (Heymanns, 1980); John Owen Haley, Antitrust in Japan: Problems of Enforcement, in CURRENT
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 121-33 (Haley ed.,1978); J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to
Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604-45 (1985).
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the context of U.S.-European or Japanese-European trade negotiations. 6
Whether isolated to U.S.-Japanese trade conflicts or extended to multilateral
trade relations, the fundamental question of whether, in general, competition
law enforcement has any significant effect on trade remains unanswered.
My purpose here, therefore, is to examine these issues and at least to set out
the principal lines of inquiry and concerns. This analysis begins with the
narrower question of whether differences in enforcement regimes among
two or three markets matter and concludes with the more general issue of
what measures related to enforcement seem most appropriate as a compo-
nent of efforts toward international "harmonization" of national and
regional competition policies.
Before determining whether differences in enforcement matter, three
preliminary points should be stressed. First, the focus is enforcement itself,
not the policy being enforced - that is, whether, irrespective of the policies
being enforced, differences in the sanctions used, the processes involved,
and the degree or level of enforcement attained are themselves consequen-
tial factors in either promoting or restricting trade. The questions asked are
what differences in enforcement do exist, whether they matter, and, if so,
what measures - national, bilateral, and multinational - would be both
corrective and feasible.
Of course policy does matter. The rules themselves are crucial in as-
sessing how they are enforced. For example, if Japan, Europe or the United
States did not have any competition law or one that allowed exercises of
monopoly power by single firms (or as a result of the concerted efforts of
several firms to exclude new entrants), the issue would be one of policy -
its absence - not its enforcement. The initial assumption here is that as a
matter of rules, Japan, Europe and the United States all prohibit such ex-
clusionary exercises of monopoly power. To the extent that this premise is-
accurate, less effective enforcement in one market would prevent or deter
new entrants in that market, thereby distorting inter-market trade in favor of
established firms who would have greater access to all three markets than
6 Although in Germany considerable attention has been paid to the what some critics viewed as
serious weakness of available sanctions under the German Law Against Restraints of Competition [Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeshrtnkungen (GWB), BGBI. 1 1081 (1957)], little if any attention has been paid to
the enforcement of European competition rules by those concerned with U.S.-European trade relations. As
mentioned below, this is notable, although not perhaps surprising, given the ostensibly more stringent
sanctions available under Japanese law. See, e.g., John 0. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A
Comparative Study of German and Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REV. 471-508 (1983).
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their existing or potential competitors. However, as I have argued else-
where, at some level the presence of presumptively prohibited restraints on
competition - notably horizontal price fixing and output restrictions -
without effective restrictions on new entry should induce market entry.
Thus, any failure to enforce such policies should encourage entry and fur-
ther eliminate the violation without enforcement action.7 By the same
token, more rigorous enforcement could deter new entry by enhancing ri-
valry among established firms. Consequently, under these circumstances,
greater competition law enforcement could reduce, rather than promote, in-
termarket trade.
A second caveat is implicit in what has been said thus far. The pri-
mary concern here is less with what an economist might presumably
consider an optimal regime of international trade than with market access
and fair treatment of actual and potential competitors based in separate
"home" markets. It does not necessarily follow, however counterintuitive it
may be, that limiting access of potential competitors from other national
7 See John 0. Haley, Weak Law, Strong Competition, and Trade Barriers: Competitiveness as a
Disincentive to Foreign Entry into Japanese Markets, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT
CHANGE? 203-35 (Yamamura ed., 1990). Professor Tyson, who currently chairs the U.S. President's
Council of Economic Advisors, implies that weak enforcement may have enabled Japanese firms "to
cartelize the Japanese marketplace at the expense of foreign companies." TYSON, supra note 2, at 100.
She does not explain, however, why in the absence of identified barriers to entry horizontal restraints on
competition did not induce rather than deter foreign firms from entering the Japanese market. Indeed, one
of the few concrete examples cited by Tyson of an alleged violation of Japan's Antimonopoly and Fair
Trade Law causing injury to a foreign firm was a complaint of unfair competition by Cray Research
against its Japanese rivals for price discounting. Id at 81. Although targeted price-cutting is a common
tactic used by cartels to eliminate entrants, neither Tyson nor other critics cite any evidence of such
practice having been directed against Cray or other foreign firms seeking to enter the Japanese market.
Instead of exclusionary practices that keep new entrants out, Tyson and other may have in mind the
sort of predatory behavior that the Japanese electronics industry was alleged to have practiced in
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp. - in other words, that lax competition law
enforcement in Japan enabled Japanese firms to establish effective cartels in their home market, the profits
from which were used to subsidize predatory entry in to the U.S. market. 475 U.S. 594 (1986). A variant
of the same theme is that effective cartelization of Japanese markets enabled Japanese firms to reinvest
their market gains and thereby achieve learning curves or other gains from the resulting economies of scale
that made them internationally competitive. Evidence of Japanese cartels in the 1960s supports both
arguments. The premise of potential public welfare gains that may result from restrictive practices of the
second, however, challenges the fundamental argument in favor of competition policy. In any event,
whatever the merits of these claims with respect to the 1950s and 1960s, there is little if any evidence of
similar cartelization since the mid 1970s.
A potentially more fruitful line of inquiry is suggested in the discussion of exclusionary cost-raising
tactics, especially in relation to supplier relations and exclusive dealing arrangements that are currently
considered legal under most competition laws. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209-93
(1986).
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markets invariably distorts competition in either the restricted market or the
global market taken as a whole. Were the established firms in the restricted
market sufficiently competitive, more effective competition policy en-
forcement might not promote a more optimal level of overall competition.
Yet, it would still favor established firms in the restricted market over their
intermarket rivals and tend to create distortions in the patterns, if not the ef-
ficiency benefits, of intermarket trade.
Some might well also argue that such dichotomy between "foreign"
and "home market" firms has become less and less meaningful in a global
economy characterized by firm alliances. In terms of ownership, financing,
and suppliers, the integration of major manufacturers in the international
economy makes it difficult to distinguish between foreign and domestic
firms in any meaningful way. In this context, trade statistics are profoundly
misleading. Nevertheless, Japan's surpluses in its bilateral trade with the
United States in manufactured goods (but not primary products or services)
has had extraordinary political influence.
Perceptions count. Public and private belief in the United States and
Japan, that their respective enforcement, practices have had anticompetitive
consequences, has tended to foster a climate in which protectionist pres-
sures on both sides of the Pacific can only mount. It is widely believed that
Japan's failure to enforce legal prohibitions against private restraints of
competition has hindered foreign firm entry into national or regional con-
sumer and industrial markets. As a result, public concern that U.S.
manufacturers have been significantly disadvantaged has induced strong
political pressures for effective countermeasures. 8 One foreseeable result
has been public support for the imposition of protectionist trade restrictions.
The enactment of section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and its threatened use
to impose restrictions on Japanese access to the U.S. market is a prime ex-
ample. In Japan, pressures to diversify and reduce trade with the United
States, as well as to resist legitimate U.S. pressures to reform licensing re-
quirements and other formal barriers to new entry, also tend to have greater
public appeal.
The political dimensions of the problems explored here lead to the
third caveat. Institutional factors Preclude reliance on economic analysis as
8 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, No Rest on Trade: Washington's View, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994,
at DI; James Gerstenzang & David Holley, U.S. Reimposes Law to Allow Trade Sanctions on Japan, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at Al.
MAR. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
the principal determinant of either competition or trade policy. The influ-
ence of economic analysis in U.S. competition policy is substantial, but it
should be emphasized, this is because U.S. competition policy is largely of
judicial making. Unlike competition rules, U.S. trade policy has historically
been a highly discretionary prerogative of the executive branch. Until the
mid-1970s, legislative controls were quite limited. Even today, legislatively
mandated rules remain subject to a significant degree of executive discre-
tion. Moreover, the legislative controls that do exist tend largely to be
political rather than legal in that they take the form of reports to Congress
instead of legislated rules. The legal restrictions of executive discretion
have been limited to carefully worded legislative mandates. Neither
Congress nor the President have allowed the courts to develop trade law in
the manner of competition policy. The opportunities for judicial review and
intervention remain even more restricted. The end result is that, in compari-
son with competition policies, economic analysis tends to be substantially
less influential than immediate political concerns. Thus, U.S. courts have
not been able to impose on U.S. trade rules the constraints of economic
analysis incorporated in their construction of U.S. competition rules.
Equally important, they have not yet considered the interrelationships be-
tween the two.
Against this background, the aims of this article are twofold. The
first is to evaluate the justifications for more stringent international trade
rules based on alleged lack of reciprocity or competitive advantage resulting
from differences in the enforcement of competition rules. The second is to
explore the implications for competition law enforcement in proposals for
international harmonization of national and regional competition policies, as
well as the use of competition law as a principal instrument of trade policy.
What, then, are the differences in the enforcement of competition
rules in the United States, Europe, and Japan? And what effect, if any, do
these differences have on trade?
II. ENFORCEMENT REGIMES: THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, GERMANY,
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The United States exhausts the list of sanctions and procedures for
the enforcement of competition law - administrative fines, criminal sanc-
tions, and private damage actions. In no country is the potential for
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coercive state intervention as great or the range of applicable sanctions as
broad. From the commencement of an administrative investigation or pri-
vate damage action, both the scope and compulsive force of civil discovery
are unrivaled. And the costs of defense in any enforcement action are un-
surpassed. The complexity of enforcement of competition policy in the
United States is compounded by the division of jurisdiction between two
public enforcement authorities, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and
the Justice Department, acting through its Antitrust Division. The Antitrust
Division of the Department has concurrent jurisdiction with the FTC for
most competition rule violations and exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal
penalties. The additional availability and incentives for private damage ac-
tions ensure that enforcement of competition law in the U.S. is more
widespread and potentially harsher than in any other jurisdiction.
Japan follows the United States in the variety of sanctions and poten-
tial enforcement powers. Japan's Antimonopoly Law provides for: 1)
administrative fines, including, since 1977, a special surcharge on illegal
cartel profits (kachdkin); 2) damage actions, which can be brought under
either the general tort provisions of the Civil Code or the special provision
of the Antimonopoly Act itself; 3) criminal penalties; and 4) administrative
authority to restructure monopolistic firms.
The Japanese FTC is the exclusive enforcement agency. It is, how-
ever, one of only two national administrative units subject to direct cabinet
oversight without cabinet representation, the other being the Imperial
Household Agency. The directors of such diverse and arguably less signifi-
cant agencies as the National Public Safety Commission and the Defense
Agency are accorded the status of a minister of state.9 As a result, the FTC
has less influence as an agency at the cabinet level on economic policy. Yet
it is still subject to political influence by both legislators, party leaders and
the economic ministries, in particular the Ministry of Finance.
In Germany, the principal sanctions for violations of competition
rules are administrative fines. The German Law Against Restraints of
Competition10 does provide for damage actions but not criminal sanctions.
And like Japan, a single administrative agency, the Federal Cartel Office
9 Other such agencies include the Management and Coordination Agency, the Hokkaido
Development Agency, the Economic Planning Agency, the Science and Technology Agency, the
Environment Agency, and the National Land Agency.
10 See Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeshrankungen (GWB) [German Law Against Restraints of
Competition] BGBI. 11081 (1957)
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(Bundeskartellamt) has exclusive jurisdiction at the national level for public
enforcement, but state (Land) authorities also share responsibility for local
violations. As a quasi-independent agency organized within the Economic
Ministry, the Federal Cartel Office reflects a compromise between the inde-
pendent agency of the Japanese variety, influenced by the U.S. FTC model
and the approach exemplified by the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department, under which competition policy enforcement is entrusted to a
politically accountable department of the executive (cabinet).
The European Commission relies exclusively on administrative fines
for enforcement of competition policy under regulations issued pursuant to
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 1 For the enforcement of investi-
gatory orders, the fines are fixed at 100 to 5,000 European Currency Units
("ECU") (currently from about US$130 to US$7,500), but for substantive
violations, they may be imposed in amounts equaling up to ten percent of
the offending enterprise's previous year's turnover. 12 . Private damage
actions are not available under European Union ("EU") law, but violations
of EU competition law are recognized as delicts (torts) under the national
private law of at least some member states. Very few of such private
damage actions, however, have been brought.1
3
Responsibility for enforcement of European competition policy is
delegated to a Commission-level directorate, the Directorate-General for
Competition ("DGIV"). The head of the DGIV has an official status in the
European Union that is similar to that of a minister in Japan and Germany
or department secretary in the United States.
No administrative enforcement authority under any of these regimes
is fully independent of political influence over at least the broad directions
of competition policy enforcement. In the United States, the separation of
legislative and executive powers under the American presidential system,
combined with two separate administrative enforcement agencies, arguably
ensures greater legislative and executive influence over enforcement poli-
cies than is the case with either the Japanese or European experience. In
contrast, the influence of other policy-making and implementing
II See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] arts. 85-86.
12 See Council Regulation No. 17, art. 15(2), 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87. Whether the fine is
measured in terms of the turnover for the particular products involved in the violation or of the enterprise's
overall business is not clarified in Regulation No. 17.
13 See cases cited in BARRY E. HAWK, 2 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 42 n. 146 (1993 ed.).
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bureaucracies in Japan and Europe appear to be significantly greater. As a
result, it is considerably more difficult to coordinate competition and trade
policy in the United States or to assure coherence in economic policies.
The role of judiciary also differs considerably among the three sys-
tems. The United States is the most distinctive. As noted previously, in
contrast to Japanese, German and European practice, as well as United
States experience in the area of international trade law, U.S. competition
rules have been developed largely by judicial decision rather than either
legislative enactment or administrative regulation. Moreover, courts in the
United States, unlike those in Japan or continental Europe (including the
European Union), also participate actively in the enforcement of competi-
tion as well as other regulatory rules as a partner in public law enforcement
with executive agencies. In Japan and Europe, fines are imposed by the re-
sponsible administrative enforcement agency subject to de novo judicial
review, whereas, in the United States, they are imposed in civil judicial pro-
ceedings initiated by the agency. More subtle differences restrain judicial
authority in Japan and Europe in both criminal cases and private damage
actions. Although ostensibly similar, here too U.S. courts play a role more
akin to an independent enforcement authority than in either Japan or
Europe. In Japanese, European, and more general civil law practice influ-
enced by separation of powers principles, judicial and administrative courts
tend predominately to have a more exclusively reviewing role. Without the
contempt powers of their common law counterparts, judges in civil law ju-
risdictions rarely if ever are called upon by administrative authorities to
enforce administrative orders and decisions. In civil damage (Japan and
Germany) and crimihal actions (Japan only), administrative decisions and
interpretations of the statute, albeit not determinative, tend to be treated
with considerable deference.
The prevalence of private damage actions coupled with greater judi-
cial independence, at least with respect to federal judges, combine to reduce
relative coherence in competition and trade policies even further in the
United States. Unlike Europe or Japan, without legislative changes, judicial
definition of competition policy and its enforcement through private dam-
age actions are not subject to executive control.
Differences in appellate practice - notably the European and
Japanese presumption of de novo review of facts on first appeal in civil and
criminal cases - also affect administrative proceedings. The general lack
MAR. 1995
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of de novo review helps to explain why administrative procedures in the
United States are considerably more "judicialized" than in Europe or Japan.
As a consequence, from a Japanese or European perspective, they seem ex-
traordinarily complex and costly. On the other hand, from a U.S. viewpoint,
administrative proceedings in both Japan and Europe seem quite informal.
Recently U.S. practice has begun to influence both, especially with respect
to hearings. Japanese FTC enforcement proceedings have been governed
from the early 1950s by detailed procedural requirements to ensure accu-
racy and fairness. And a recent Tokyo High Court decision invalidated an
FTC decision on the grounds that one of the five members of the
Commission who decided the case had been chief of the Investigations
Bureau at the time the Commission staff initiated the preliminary investiga-
tions years earlier. 14 European and German enforcement procedures are
considerably less constrained by procedural requirements. For example, the
European Commission has only recently begun to use hearing examiners
and still does not practice as complete a separation of investigatory, prose-
cutorial, and decision-making functions as required in the United States or
Japan. 15
Effective government action to enforce legal rules requires that public
enforcement authorities have access to information to determine compli-
ance. The investigatory powers of U.S. enforcement authorities are
considerably broader and more coercive than any of their counterparts in
Japan or Europe. The combination of reporting requirements, extensive
discovery powers, and the availability of judicial contempt sanctions for
their enforcement enables significantly greater access to evidence in both
public and private law enforcement actions in the United States, with, it
should be added, equally greater costs for both prosecution and defense.
Unable to compel full disclosure as effectively as their U.S. counterparts,
both Japanese and European competition law authorities are forced to rely
on surprise site searches as the principal means of gathering evidence of
violations. The costs and personnel required, however, preclude frequent
resort to these means. As a result, it appears that evidentiary problems
alone reduce considerably the effectiveness of enforcement.
14 Judgment of Feb. 25, 1994 (Toshiba Chem. K.K. v. Fair Trade Comm'n), Tokyo K6sai [Tokyo
High Court].
15 For a comparison of the "transparency" of U.S. and European administrative enforcement
proceedings, see observations by Ivo Van Bael et al., in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN E.C. AND U.S.
COMPETITION LAW 192-214 ( Piet Jan Slot & Alison McDonnell eds., 1993).
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In terms of enforcement personnel, Japan is relatively strong. With
484 staff employees, of whom about 200 are assigned as investigators, the
Japanese FTC staff is somewhat larger than either the German Cartel Office
or the Division IV staff and on a per capita basis has nearly as many en-
forcement personnel as the United States. The Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department currently employs 638 persons, and the FTC has a staff
of 330, mostly attorneys with a few economists, whose primary responsibil-
ity is antitrust law enforcement. 16 In the case of criminal actions, however,
Japan is severely limited by a dearth of procurators - only 2100 to handle
nationwide all criminal prosecutions and civil litigation in which the state of
Japan is a party.
Once a violation is determined to exist, differences seem to diminish.
Until the late 1970s, Japanese penalties for violations of the Antimonopoly
and Fair Trade Law were without question considerably weaker than those
available under U.S., German, or European Union law. The addition of an
illegal profits surcharge in 1977, modeled after the German mehrerlos,
parallels the basic penalty under Regulation No. 17. Although the method
for calculating the fine was amended in 1991 to increase the maximum and
broaden its application, the Japanese surcharge remains narrower in defini-
tion and application. Nevertheless, in 1992, the Japanese FTC levied a
surcharge in 10 cases against 103 enterprises, ranging from Y220,000
(approximately US$2,200) to Y236 million (approximately US$2.3 million)
for a total of Y1.99 billion (US$19.9 million).17 In comparison, in 1993
Antitrust Division enforcement actions resulted in fines amounting to
US$40.4 million against 64 corporations and US$1.86 million against
individuals.18 Although on average the Japanese fines appear to be less
than half of the U.S. counterparts, without information on the size of the
firms involved, it is difficult to assess their actual impact. In any event,
however, as amended and currently applied, the Japanese surcharge cannot
be considered negligible. By almost any measure the United States far
16 PERSONNEL OFFICE, FTC, 1993 ANNUAL REP. (Feb. 24, 1994) (citing personnel statistics from
FTC and Dep't of Justice).
17 KOSEI TORIHIKI I'INKAI [FAIR TRADE COMMISSION], NENJI HOKOU [ANNUAL REPORT] 72-74
(1993t8 Antitrust Division, Dep't of Justice, Workload Statistics 1984-1993, 8 (internal memo).
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outdistances Europe and Japan in terms of the number and variety of
enforcement actions 19 as well as the severity of the penalties imposed.
III. DOES ENFORCEMENT MATTER?
Whether differences in the means and levels of enforcement matter
depends upon the answers to two other questions. First, we need to know
what policies are pursued or, more narrowly, what anticompetitive conduct
is prevalent but tolerated. In addition, an equally fundamental but seldom
asked question is the extent to which it is appropriate to equate lax en-
forcement with such tolerance. Neither question is easily answered. Of
greater certainty is the issue of costs and the effect of anticompetitive cost-
imposing practices.
A. Differences in Tolerance ofAnticompetitive Conduct
Violations of competition rules have an axiomatic effect on interna-
tional trade. As exercises of monopoly power reduce the volume of goods
and services produced within any market there will be a reduction of trade
in these goods and services. However, to the extent that this reduction pro-
duces increased trade in substitute goods and services, no overall reduction
in trade may occur. Nonetheless, anticompetitive conduct will have dis-
torted trade patterns. Conversely, to the extent that competition law is
effective in fostering greater competition by eliminating trade distorting ex-
ercises of monopoly power, the more effective the enforcement of
competition rules proscribing such conduct, and hence the smaller such
distortions should become. Therefore, as a matter of policy, the primary is-
sue becomes the desirability or undesirability of particular distortions. Ob-
viously, the answers given are not always the same. Different regimes will
have different priorities. For example, in order to promote the flow of
goods and services across national borders within the European Union,
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome is construed to deny holders of national
patent rights the right recognized by both the United States and Japan to
prevent parallel importation.
19 See W. Wallace Kirkpatrick, Antitrust to the Supreme Court: The Expediting Act, 37 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 746-87 (1969); W. Wallace Kirkpatrick, Antitrust Enforcement in the Seventies, 30 CAT-. U. L.
REV. 431-81 (1981).
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As a trade issue - or more accurately as a national trade issue - the
focus here is less the effect of these distortions on trade than on traders
themselves. The principal concern, as explained above, is how such distor-
tions affect traders and the fairness of regimes in relation to treatment of
firms in separate home markets. It should be emphasized that the com-
monly used standards, reciprocity and national treatment, for measuring
fairness can be satisfied without concern for an effective competition pol-
icy. Neither reciprocity nor national treatment requires competition or an
expansion of international trade. For example, were all national regimes to
allow substantial restraints of competition that barred foreign entrants
equally - unquestioned reciprocity - the consequences would include a
significant reduction of international trade, but would not necessarily be un-
fair in terms of giving particular advantage or disadvantage to firms from
one regime or another.
Similarly, a national treatment standard of fairness may be met even
were only one national regime to allow established firms - domestic and
foreign - to establish barriers that prevented new entry. Because such a
policy would not advantage established domestic firms over established
foreign firms, the requirements of national treatment would be satisfied de-
spite the trade distortions and adverse political responses that might result.
For example, assume that rival firms A, E and J in Country J are
treated equally in that all are subject to the same restrictions and controls
governing competition and potentially anticompetitive conduct, and that
they also bear the same potential costs for legal services related to the en-
forcement of these controls. Assume, in addition, that similar equality in
treatment and costs among firms A, E, and J pertain in countries A and E,
although there are significant differences in regulation and costs between
countries A, E, and J, but which are borne equally by competing firms in
each market. Hence, all other factors being equal, all three firms would be
subject to the same regulation and costs. The playing fields would be equal;
differences in enforcement become a wash. They would not advantage or
disadvantage any firm - although to the extent anticompetitive conduct is
permitted, there may be significant distortions of trade - with resulting
potential losses or more accurately foregone benefits.
Were both reciprocity and national treatment to pertain, it is difficult
to conceive of any inter-firm disadvantage or advantage. However, national
treatment without reciprocity may of course disadvantage firms established
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in one market but not in others. For example, if, as a result of national dif-
ferences in the effectiveness of anticompetitive restrictions on new entry,
firm A were forced to compete with firms J and E in country A but unable
to enter the markets and compete with firm J in country J or firm E in coun-
try E, it would not be able to achieve the same economies of scale of either
firm J or firm E.
Nevertheless, national differences in the costs of enforcement alone
can create a home market advantage or disadvantage. Assume that the
principal market of each firm A, E, and J is its home market. Substantially
lower, or higher, costs related to the enforcement of competition rules in
any one of these countries would advantage, or disadvantage, the home
market firm. For example, assume firm A has significantly higher costs re-
lated to the enforcement of competition rules in its dominant market than
firms J or E and firm J has substantially lower enforcement expenses in its
dominant market than firms A or E. Unless offset by other costs, firm J will
enjoy a competitive advantage over firms A and E, and firm A will suffer a
competitive disadvantage in relation to firms J and E.
Although barriers to entry and therefore competition policies that
curtail such barriers do matter, enforcement of such competition rules itself
becomes an issue only if 1) competition policy prohibits exclusionary
practices20 and those rules are not adequately enforced, or 2) there are sub-
stantial differences in the costs resulting from enforcement of competition
rules to competing or potentially competing firms.
B. Measuring Effective Enforcement
Taken for granted in most, if not all, discussions of enforcement of
competition policy is an equation of active enforcement and its effective-
ness. The greater the variety and severity of penalties and the number of
enforcement actions, the more effective competition policy appears. The er-
ror of the equation is apparent. The United States leads the industrial world
in the number of criminal prosecutions and severity of penalties. Few
would argue from our crime statistics that we have a more effective criminal
justice system, i.e., one that achieves a lower level of criminal activity. We
know that this is not true because we have a reasonably accurate measure of
20 Without effective exclusionary practices or other barriers to entry, cartels within a national
economy are quite difficult to maintain. See supra note 7.
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crime and criminal activity. Unlike common crimes, however, we do not
have any objective count of proscribed anticompetitive behavior. Because
no accurate measure of illegal conduct apart from the number of
enforcement actions itself is available, we tend necessarily to use
enforcement statistics as the measure of effectiveness. We thus equate the
number of cases and the severity of the penalties with effectiveness and
conversely lax enforcement with tolerance. We need to be reminded of
what we do not know. In fact, there does not exist to my knowledge any
credible evidence on the relative effectiveness of any competition policy
enforcement regime. We simply do not know and cannot say that there is
more or less illegal behavior in any country compared to any other. In other
words, no empirical data are available to correct profound differences in
perceptions within any of these countries regarding the extent of
anticompetitive conduct in the others.
Without such measures, we are equally unable to assess accurately
the effectiveness in eliminating or deterring proscribed anticompetitive
conduct of one enforcement regime over another. Profound differences in
social control exist, for example, between the United States and Japan. The
Japanese have been far more successful in preventing and controlling crime
without resort to formal state controls. 21 The observation by'Hiroshi Iyori22
on the deterrent effects of reputation, particularly denial of Imperial honors
(kunsho), in preventing anticompetitive conduct in Japan should thus be
highlighted. Low crime rates also produce less enforcement activity. The
possibility that Japan's industrial structure in fact produces less anticom-
petitive behavior than in the United States and Europe must not be
dismissed.23 Nor, to my knowledge, have any foreign entrants yet tested the
effectiveness of existing competition rules in Japan. Few, if any, formal
complaints have been filed with the Japanese FTC by foreign firms against
Japanese firms for illegal exclusionary practices. Such complaints - along
21 See, e-g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).
22 Hiroshi lyori, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation, in LAW
AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: JAPANESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 56-82, 61
(Saxonhouse & Yamamura eds., 1986).
23 For greater detail on U.S. misperceptions regarding competition in Japan, see JOHN OWEN HALEY,
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 146.47 (1991); John 0. Haley,
Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Implications for United States Trade, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 335-66 (1991);
John 0. Haley, Weak Law, Strong Competition, and Trade Barriers: Competitiveness as a Disincentive to
Foreign Entry into Japanese Markets, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE? 203-35
(Yamamura ed., 1990).
MAR. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
with criticism of Japan's enforcement regime - tend to be made to U.S.
trade negotiators not Japanese enforcement authorities.
C. Costs
In recent years, there has been considerable dispute over the appro-
priateness of the United States' mix of sanctions and various features of its
enforcement process. With respect to sanctions, the use of private damage
actions, especially the availability of trebled damages, has been widely
criticized.24 Predatory litigation, it is argued,25 has been used to invite or
enforce competitor collusion,26 to raise competitor's costs, 27 or otherwise to
deter entry or eliminate rivals.28 As summarized by economists William
Breit and Kenneth Elzinga, two of the most prominent early critics of treble
damage actions as a antitrust penalty, a consensus has emerged - at least
among one community of scholars:
The prevailing consensus [of the new learning on private dam-
age actions] is that the current statutory construction needs
changing, though proposals for reform are somewhat diverse.
They range from complete reliance on public enforcement to
recommendations that would effectively lower the damage
multiple, raise the requirements for eligibility to recover dam-
ages, and preclude private actions in specified circumstances.
Secondary reforms would reward attorneys' fees to either pre-
vailing party.29
24 See, e.g., PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING (Lawrence J. White
ed., 1988); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor
Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551-603 (1991); Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.
REV. 565-630 (1991-92).
25 Myers, supra note 21, at 585-96.
26 See, e.g., Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.
1982); James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Government Process, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of
Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 75 (1985).
27 See, e.g., Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 687 F. 2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitve Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over
Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
28 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
29 William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 405,443 (1985).
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Little in the criticism of predatory litigation and private damage ac-
tions has special bearing on international trade. The "perverse effects" that
Breit and Elzinga note apply generally throughout the United States and do
not have a particularized effect either on international trade overall or, it ap-
pears, on foreign firms doing business in the United States. Although, to
my knowledge, no empirical study of U.S. antitrust damage actions has at-
tempted to compare the number of private actions brought against foreign as
opposed to domestic competitors, the collected data does not show a greater
proportion of damage actions involving foreign defendants. 30 Whatever the
effects of competitor damage suits, they do not appear to impose greater
costs or barriers to entry than faced by their U.S. rivals.
However, applied to trade regulation cases, the same argument leads
to a very different result. The defense of an administrative action under
U.S. trade law is costly. John H. Jackson estimates that a decade ago the
private costs per annum of U.S. import regulation amounted to 97 million
dollars.31 Nearly all of these costs were borne by foreign firms. Domestic
competitor petitioners need not incur the litigation costs borne by plaintiffs
in a private antitrust action. That cost is borne by the respondent firms and
the investigating agencies. As noted by Spencer Weber Waller:
[Foreign respondents] must respond to extensive information
requests by the International Trade Administration. of the
Department of Commerce in conducting its investigation.
These costs may result in a heavier burden when spread over
the respondents' sales in the United States. Foreign firms will
normally have a smaller body of sales in the United States
compared.to the domestic producers, either because the foreign
producers are smaller firms or because U.S. exports represent
only a7 fraction of their total sales. Thus, even where each side
incurs similar legal costs, the foreign firms may have to absorb
a higher burden per dollar of United States sales.32
30 See John 0. Haley, United States Antitrust Beyond the Borders: The Japanese Experience, in
AUSTL. INDUS. DEV. ASS'N BULL., Nov. 1980, at 7-15.
31 John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of
Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1587 (1984).
32 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 13.02 (1992).
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It makes little sense, therefore, for a U.S. competitor to use the private anti-
trust action as a cost-imposing tactic to the extent that a similar aim can be
achieved for less by resort to a trade action. United States trade procedures
are thus akin to the Japanese distribution system as a potentially effective
cost-raising barrier to entry.
On its face, Japan's Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law is second only
to the United States in the variety of sanctions and means of enforcement.
The statute provides for administrative fines, criminal sanctions, and private
damage actions. The investigatory powers of the administrative enforcem-
ent agency, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") are phrased in
the broadest terms. However, all law enforcement in Japan is subject to
significant limitations. Some of these limitations are shared by all civil law
systems - Germany and the European Union included. There is no con-
tempt, limited discovery, strict legislative control over criminal sanctions
(especially incarceration), and stringent requirements for proof. More par-
ticular restraints on law enforcement exist in Japan. Many relate to
problems of institutional capacity: a chronic lack of judges, lawyers, and
prosecutors.
The untold story of law enforcement is the cost of defense imposed
on the innocent or, at least, those not proven guilty. In the United States,
less than ten percent of all private damage actions ever go to trial, and over
fifty percent are settled without court action. 33 In the case of public enfor-
cement actions, in civil actions less than one in ten cases investigated end
with a judicially confirmed violation in either a civil or criminal action or
both.34  The analysis by Kauper and Snyder of the Georgetown Private
Antitrust Litigation Project sample of 1,938 antitrust damage actions (1,935
of which were filed between the years 1973 and 1983), revealed that more
than a quarter of all private damage actions are dismissed.35 Of the cases
litigated (less than ten percent), plaintiffs won less than a third.36 Moreover,
over one-third of the actions were filed by competitors. 37 In other words, a
substantial number of presumptively innocent parties are forced to bear the
33 Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Enforcement:
Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1185, 1188 tbl. 5.
34 Seeid. at 1176tbl. 1.
35 Id. at 1188 tbl. 5, 1189.
36 Id at 1205.
37 Id. at 1184.
VOL. 4 No. I
COMPETITIONAND TRADE POLICY
costs of defending legal actions brought in large number by their competi-
tors.
The pattern for Japan is somewhat similar. Nearly a third of all cases
investigated by the Japanese FTC end with a warning. Less than ten percent
result in a formal decision.38 However, few private damage cases have been
brought. To the .extent that the costs of responding to civil discovery and
other investigatory proceedings are significantly higher in the United States
than Japan, the costs imposed on innocent respondents are correspondingly
lower. In any event, foreign firms do not appear to suffer disproportionally
in either system. At worst, the costs are a wash in that they are borne
equally by home market and foreign firms.
The argument that, with respect to foreign entrants, differences in the
costs of enforcement of competition rules may be a wash does not apply to
trade policy enforcement actions. By definition, trade policies are directed
at foreign not domestic entrants. Thus, the costs of defending enforcement
actions brought under a country's trade rules are borne exclusively by for-
eign entrants. Again, assuming that the costs of law enforcement in the
United States are significantly higher than for Europe or Japan, U.S. firms
are able to impose greater costs on their actual or potential foreign
competitors than can be imposed on them.
Nonetheless, it appears that the litigation costs borne by established
firms in the United States are considerably higher than those borne in the
home markets of any rivals in Japan and Europe. The U.S. legal system can
thus be compared to the Japanese distribution system. Both are
extraordinarily inefficient and impose significant costs on all firms in the
marketplace whether established or newly entering. Both, therefore, raise
the costs of doing business and thereby constitute a barrier to entry.
Neither, however, appears to advantage home market firms at the expense
of their foreign competitors. Indeed, as a cost of doing business in the home
market, they have the opposite effect.
In conclusion, it appears that neither U.S. nor Japanese complaints
against the other regarding the pernicious effects of competition policy
enforcement appear to have much merit. Lax competition policy
enforcement in Japan cannot be demonstrated to have hurt U.S. firms or
greatly benefited Japanese firms since the mid 1970s once most formal
barriers to foreign participation had been removed. Nor, however, has
38 lyori, supra note 19, at 76 n.36.
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private antitrust enforcement in the United States significantly
disadvantaged Japanese and other foreign firms entering the U.S. market.
Related concerns over the abuse of U.S. international trade procedures by
home market firms against foreign rivals have much more merit.
IV. SOLUTIONS?
Full harmonization of enforcement would be the optimal response in
attempting to reduce trade distorting advantages or disadvantages to com-
peting firms from national differences in the enforcement of competition
rules. One proposal to this end is uniformity in sanctions. For example, the
International Antitrust Code Working Group, sponsored by the Munich Max
Planck Institute, includes provisions for common sanctions in their Draft
Code. 39 They propose that all national competition law provide for injunc-
tive relief, fines, disgorgement of profits, damages, and publication of
judgments.40 However, the Draft Code would allow differences between na-
tional regimes with respect to imprisonment, multiple damages, punitive
damages, and suspension or termination of business. 41 Such proposals do
not, however, address the critical problems - differences in the effective-
ness and costs of enforcement irrespective of similarities in sanctions. The
variety of sanctions that are available is less significant than their use and
effect.
Elimination of national differences in the fundamental processes of
law enforcement, ranging from attorney fee arrangements to the jury sys-
tem, is simply not feasible. However, greater awareness of differences in
the efficiencies of law enforcement regimes and sensitivity by judges and
administrative law enforcement authorities to their anticompetitive effects is
possible. For this purpose, greater coordination and cooperation among
public law enforcement authorities in the United States, Europe and Japan
are welcome. Such cooperation might well be extended to greater use of
various means of intervention by public authorities in private enforcement
actions where their anticompetitive purpose and effect are in question. The
39 See DRAFT INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE (Final Munich Version 1993).
40 Id art. 15, §§ 1-7.
41 Id art. 15, § I.
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role of the United States amicus brief in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.42 comes to mind.
A similar role could be played in trade regulation actions. In the
United States, the only effective institutional forum within which conflicts
between competition and trade policies can be effectively addressed is the
Department of Justice. The role of the Department in trade regulation re-
mains less significant, although it has grown in recent years. Questions
concerning the legality of U.S. actions are now more routinely aired with
the Department and its voice is influential. Unfortunately, the record of
Justice Department's responses does not bode well for a more vigorous
application of competition policy concerns in the context of trade regula-
tion. Executive branch domestic and international policy concerns have
priority. The Department has appeared to have been more likely to justify,
rather than challenge, anticompetitive trade policy positions.43
The presence of the head of Directorate-General IV as a full member
of the European Commission ensures that there is at least a voice for
competition policy at the highest administrative level. Such a reform seems
especially appropriate for Japan. Elevating the chair of the Fair Trade
Commission to cabinet status would create a similar scheme. In the United
States, such result could be achieved were the antitrust division of the
Justice Department included formally within the circle of public agencies -
notably, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
Commerce Department, and the International Trade Commission _- ac-
tively concerned with trade policies. The Division should at least be
authorized to play a watchdog role with respect to the probable effects of
trade restrictions on competition, including the right to evaluate competitor
petitions at the time of filing and to intervene in proceedings.
To the extent that the costs of law enforcement, generally, and
competition rules, in particular, impose relatively greater burdens on firms
based in the United States or with their principal markets in the United
States, efforts should continue to be made to improve the efficiencies in
U.S. enforcement procedures. Needless to say, Japanese and European
resistance can be anticipated to any attempts to equalize such costs by
42 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
43 See, e.g., WALLER, supra note 29, § 14.07. In Waller's words, "the Antitrust Division has become
an adjunct to United States trade policy, counseling and advising the other branches and departments of the
United States government on how t6 implement trade restraints that cannot be challenged on competition
grounds." Id at 14-25.
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seeking to impose similar burdens through reforms designed to introduce
American-style enforcement measures, such as treble damage actions.
Arrangements for cooperation among the enforcement authorities
have become increasingly prevalent. They include formal agreements, such
as the 1991 European Community-United States Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement,44 as well as informal arrangements, as between the United
Department of Justice and the Japanese Ministry of Justice, with respect to
the 1994 criminal antitrust investigation in the facsimile paper industry.45
However, in a recent interview the Chairman of the Japanese FTC, Masami
Kogayu, raised doubts about the ability of the Japanese FTC to enter any
formal agreement alluding to obstacles presented by "existing Japanese
domestic laws."'46  Such agreements, nevertheless, provide a useful
mechanism to ensure greater uniformity in enforcement as well as to
ameliorate conflicts. They thus represent the minimum level of
coordination and convergence. As facilitating legislation, the newly
enacted International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act47 is a welcome
step.
A more ambitious approach would be to include agreement on
consultation within the framework of the World Trade Organization.
Perhaps a Council on Restrictive Practices and the application of the dispute
resolution mechanisms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
could be used to adjust conflicts that arise in both unilateral enforcement of
competition law as well as the anticompetitive manipulation of trade
regulation proceedings. This approach, however, would require agreement
on standards defining inappropriate proceedings.
In conclusion, no proposal fully resolves the problems and conflicts
of enforcement without major reforms to reduce the fundamental
differences that distinguish the U.S. legal system from those of its trading
44 For an evaluation of the EC-U.S. agreement, see Joseph P. Griffin, EC/US Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1051-65 (1993).
45 The Japanese Ministry of Justice attempted a spot search of Japanese thermal facsimile paper
manufacturers in response to U.S. Justice Department requests in connection with a criminal investigation
of the firms' activities in the U.S. and Canada. The search was challenged but upheld as legal in an action
filed in the Tokyo District Court. In a related Canadian enforcement action, three firms pleaded Guilty to
criminal violation of the Canadian Competition Act. Canada v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc., 56 C.P.R.
3d. 467 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div., 1994).
46 Antitrust Links with U.S. Shunned, NIKKEI WKLY, Nov. 7, 1994, at 2.
47 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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partners. The best alternatives are those that provide mechanisms to reduce
and ameliorate conflicts.

